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Abstract

Income inequality and its relationship to long-term GDP per capita growth has been
researched for decades since the development of the Kuznet’s Curve. Theoretical and
empirical research has shown mixed results including positive, negative, non-existent, or
statistically insignificant relationships. Empirical research on income inequality and
economic growth in the United States has also shown mixed results. In addition to using
existing data, this paper uses originally-constructed Gini Coefficients from 2005 to 2009.
A statistically significant negative correlation between income inequality, and both shortterm growth and long-term growth is found in the analysis of this data. Finally, this
paper attempts to justify a causal relationship between income inequality and long-term
growth.
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1. Introduction
Lord Macaulay, an early Victorian historian, poet, and critic, once wrote:
The day will come when in the State of New York, a multitude of people,
none of whom has had more than half a breakfast, or expects to have more
than half a dinner, will choose a Legislature. On one side is a statesman
preaching patience, respect for vested rights, strict observance of public
faith. One the other is a demagogue ranting about the tyranny of
capitalists and usurers, and asking why anybody should be permitted to
drink champagne and ride in a carriage when thousands of honest folk are
in want of necessaries. Which of the two candidates is likely to be
preferred by a working-man who hears his children cry for more bread?
There will be, I fear, spoliation. The spoliation will increase the distress.
The distress will produce fresh spoliation. There is nothing to stop you.1
Lord Macaulay’s premonitions about the United States have not entirely materialized and
might never in their entirety, but income inequality and wealth distribution have become
a topic of national and even international debate.
Income inequality in the United States might be the most contentious and biggest
topic for generation Y. It is the subject of political debate between and within the two
main political parties. President Barack Obama addressed the issue in his state-of-theunion message as “‘the defining issue of our time.” Rick Santorum, a Republican
presidential hopeful, proclaimed, “‘There is income inequality in America. There always
has been and, hopefully, and I do say that, there always will be.’” While he is correct in
that income inequality exists and will exist until a utopian or dystopian state (depending
on one’s political leanings) is achieved, the rate of change in income inequality in the
United States has fluctuated since economists have been able to (retroactively) record it.2
Income inequality spiked just prior to the Great Depression, then, income inequality
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Martin Bronfenbrenner, Income Distribution Theory (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1971), 14.
“Inequality: The Gap Widens, Again,” The Economist, March 10, 2012,
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seemed to level off between the late 1920s and the 1980s. Since the 1980s, income
inequality has been increasing (see Figure 1).3 In 2007, the top 10% earned 46% of the
nation’s income, while the top 0.1% earned just over 12%. From 2007 to 2009, income
declined 11.6% (adjusted for inflation) for the bottom 99% of income earners while the
top 1% suffered a 36.3% decline – the largest decline for both groups since the Great
Depression.4 Yet in 2010, after the decline, the top 1% earned an additional 11.6% in
income while the rest of income-earners saw their wages rise by 0.2%.5
The statistics cited above, along with unemployment, rising healthcare premiums,
student loans, and a “sense of despair,” have fueled the Occupy Movement.6 By shifting
the debate to the aforementioned issues, the Occupy Movement has gained momentum,
influenced policy-makers, and had an impact on the general public. In fact, anywhere
from 37% to 59% of Americans support the Movement.789 According to the Movement’s
website, the message has spread to over 100 cities in the United States and 1,500 cities
internationally.10 To people who want to understand the debate on a more quantitative
level (moral arguments aside), it is not so much the content of their message that matters,
but the effect it has on society and the economy. An estimate by the Associated Press
3
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declares taxpayers have paid around $13 million in police overtime and other municipal
services in response to Occupy.11 Whether or not one believes in more or less income
inequality, the fact of the matter is there are economic consequences to varying levels of
inequality.
Political debate aside, why is income inequality important? Similar to the
political arena, income inequality and its relation to economic growth has been a
contentious topic. Research and theory on distribution of income and economic growth
will be discussed in the literature review section. This paper hopes to address the
relationship between economic growth and income inequality in the United States using
existing data from 1963 to 2004, and originally-constructed data from the IRS from 2005
to 2009.

11

David Francis, “The Politics and Economics of Occupy Wall Street,” U.S. News World and Report,
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2. Literature Review
One of the first economists to research the relationship between income inequality
and long-term economic growth was Simon Kuznets. Similar to most research conducted
on the topic, Kuznets collected cross-country data. However, he admits, “The paper is
perhaps 5 per cent empirical information and 95 per cent speculation, some of it possibly
tainted by wishful thinking.”12 Nonetheless, grounded on his limited data, Kuznets
theorized the Kuznets Curve – an inverted U-shaped curve plotting income inequality on
the y-axis and GDP per capita on the x-axis. He theorized that “underdeveloped”
countries in the early phases of industrialization would grow in both inequality and GDP
per capita, until the maximum point on his curve where “leveling forces become strong
enough” to reduce income inequality.13 He speculated that might occur because
industrial profits will be assumed by the top 5%, but, eventually, the profits will be
distributed more evenly. He has little explanation as to why the profits might be more
equally distributed, and only points to the “scanty empirical evidence” – “[T]he
narrowing of income inequality in the developed countries is relatively recent and
probably did not characterize the earlier stages of their growth.”14 Nevertheless, Kuznets
stated that industrializing countries might not follow this curve if political and social
institutions are “long-established,” and if a decline in both birth rates and death rates
(seen in many developed countries) decreasing the “relative economic position of lower-

12

Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” The American Economic Review 45, no. 1
(1955), 23.
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Ibid., 24.
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Ibid., 18.
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income groups” occurs.15 While lacking empirical evidence, Kuznets’ research hoped to
spark interest in the topic. His hopes have come to fruition.
Fast-forwarding to the relatively recent, there are four main theoretical
approaches to the relationship between economic growth and income inequality: creditmarket imperfections, political economy, social unrest, and savings rate.16 Credit-market
imperfections entail imperfect credit markets acting in favor of the rich because of
asymmetric information or limitations in legal institutions. Therefore, there is little
access to credit – people do not trust the credit market as it is too risky – and most people
rely on wages and assets for income opportunities.17 Low income households will forego
human capital investments which have high rates of return because they do not trust the
credit markets to finance their investment. Foregoing any high rate of return implies
lower economic growth, and therefore more unequal income distribution means lower
economic growth.
Conversely, in countries where financial institutions are more developed, Galor &
Zeira postulate there will tend to be higher economic growth as human capital
investments can be financed by readily available credit.18 Therefore, richer countries
(typically having developed financial institutions) will benefit from income inequality
because everyone can access human capital investments financed by safer credit
institutions. If everyone invests in human capital, higher levels of income inequality
would have a beneficial effect on economic growth.

15

Ibid., 18.
Robert Barro, “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries,” Journal of Economic Growth 5 (2000): 5.
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60 (1993): 35-36.
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Theory involving political economy entails income or wealth redistribution
through taxes or government spending (typically social welfare). This happens, “[i]f the
mean income in an economy exceeds the median income, then a system of majority
voting tends to favor redistribution of resources from rich to poor.”19 It is argued that
greater redistribution reduces investment and therefore growth. However, there might be
a positive relationship between growth and inequality. There is a difference between exante and ex-post inequality meaning income inequality before taxes and after taxes,
respectively. Those with less ex-post inequality tend to redistribute the income the most
and cause most distortions of economic decisions.20 In this scenario, inequality is
positively correlated with economic growth and investment. Another factor to consider,
in the political economy framework, is that countries with higher inequality tend to have
the top income-earners in positions of power. Following a neo-classical economic model,
these high income-earners will spend money (in the form of lobbying) to prevent
redistribution. These activities (especially lobbying) consume resources and could lead
to higher corruption.21 In this respect, higher income inequality will negatively affect
growth.
A third factor in the relationship between growth and inequality is sociopolitical
unrest. In neo-classical economics, because of the law of diminishing returns, poorer
countries are predicted to grow faster than richer countries. Benhabib and Rustichini use
game theoretical models to show why theory and empirical evidence diverge – many

19
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poorer countries are not growing faster than richer countries.22 Conversely, high income
groups attempt to hold power (as mentioned above in the political economy theory),
while social groups, with lower incomes, will organize themselves to manipulate political
systems for more favorable redistribution. Instead of allocating this capital into
investments, the capital is spent lobbying the government. Therefore, what the low
income-earners deem “unfair” tends to stymie economic growth as they want a fair share
of the income earned through growth.23 In an empirical study of income inequality,
investment, political instability, and growth, Alesina and Perotti, find that income
inequality increases political stability, and political stability reduces investment.
Therefore, income inequality reduces growth through this channel. Their findings were
statistically significant in a sample of 75 countries from 1960 to 1985.24 However, there
are two implications to their results: 1) Fiscal redistribution increases the tax burden on
the “capitalists and investors,” thus decreasing investment, but, 2) these same policies
might reduce political and social unrest and foster investment. They speculate there must
be an optimum point where the benefits of redistribution equal the costs.25
Most likely influenced by Keynes’s General Theory, some economists believe
individual savings rates rise with higher income. Therefore, redistributing income from
high earners to low earners reduces the aggregate savings rate. Through this channel,

22

Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini “Social Conflict and Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth 1, no.
125, (1996): 125.
23
Ibid., 125.
24
Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,”
European Economic Review, Vol. 40, 6 (1996): 1203-1205.
25
Ibid., 1227.
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investment is raised causing an increase in economic growth. Income inequality
increases economic growth in a “transitional sense.”26
Similar to the theoretical research on the relationship between income inequality
and economic growth, empirical research has shown positive, negative and inconclusive
relationships. While the focus of this paper is on U.S. income inequality and GDP
growth, a look into cross-country studies is helpful. Perrson and Tabellini look into the
percentage income share of top 20% income earners in the long-run (20 year periods).
They controlled for education, using a schooling index, and political participation. In
almost all their models, they found the relationship between average 20 year GDP growth
and the income share of the top 20% of income-earners was statistically significant and
negatively correlated.27 They also found, “economical significance,” in that an increase
of one standard deviation (from the sample of the inequality measure) of 0.07 would
decrease growth by half a percentage point.28 However, there are few problems with
their analysis, including an absent control for population growth, incomplete data (their
data is spotty and dates back to 1830), varied and unreliable sources, and a limited
number of sample countries.29
Deininger and Squire compiled a fairly comprehensive dataset of Gini
Coefficients (a measurement of income inequality that will be discussed in further detail
in the methodology section) of 108 countries, dating back to the 1960s.30 In order to

26

Barro, “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries,” 9.
Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence,” NBER
Working Paper Series, Working Paper no. 3599 (1991): 21.
28
Ibid., 21.
29
Ibid., 17, 42.
30
Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,” The World Bank
Economic Review, 10, no. 3 (1996): 578.
27
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address data reliability issues they required the data be based on household surveys, be
representative of the given population, and be comprehensive, or including nonwage
earnings, self-employment, and nonmonetary income.31 They omitted any data that did
not adhere to these standards or that might contain biases or errors, whittling a dataset
from 2,600 observations to 682. They admit that, “Decisions concerning the inclusion or
exclusion of certain observations are always based on some judgment and
arbitrariness.”32 Their high quality dataset opened the door to further empirical research
on income inequality and growth.
Barro used this dataset in conjunction with GDP and investment measurements
from the World Bank and the National Bureau of Economic Research to research the
relationship between the Gini index and GDP growth.33 Barro found the estimated Gini
Coefficient’s effect on GDP per capita growth was “essentially zero.”34 However,
omitting other explanatory variables such as fertility rate shows a negative relationship
similar to other studies. Also, regressing the Gini Coefficient on GDP per capita, or
“economic development” showed a negative relationship that was statistically significant
at the p=0.059 level. Barro’s analysis also showed the Gini “lacked explanatory power
for the investment ratio” and secondary and higher level education is a “critical factor.”
The theory that income inequality hinders investment was not found to be empirically
verified, but human capital accumulation was.35 Barro also found that the Kuznets Curve
was empirically verified – income inequality increases and then decreases as a country

31

Ibid., 567-571.
Ibid., 572.
33
Barro, “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries,” 8, 10.
34
Ibid., 13.
35
Ibid.
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becomes more economically developed; however, the relationship does not explain the
“bulk of variations in inequality across countries or over time.”36
Forbes found a positive relationship using the same dataset and applying Perotti’s
economic analysis, but adding dummy variables to control for global shocks of a certain
period and country dummy variables to control for omitted country-specific, and timeinvariant biases.37 This positive relationship was both statistically significant in the short
and medium-term, but Forbes found that the model did not explain poor countries.
However, because there is little data on long-term effects of income inequality on growth,
her paper suggests it is not the definitive paper on income inequality and growth.38
More recently, the IMF in Finance and Development found a negative
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. However, instead of
regressing income inequality on GDP growth, they used the Gini Coefficient and
regressed it on “growth spells,” or “a period of at least five years that begins with an
unusual increase in the growth rate and ends with an unusual drop in growth”39 The
study controlled for other determinants of growth spells such as political institutions,
trade openness, exchange rate competitiveness, external debt, and foreign direct
investment. They found income inequality to have a negative effect on the duration of
growth spells, but argued “poorly designed efforts to reduce inequality might be
counterproductive.”40 They give the example of China reforming its agricultural policies.

36
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38
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Andrew Berg & Jonathan Ostry, “Equality and Efficiency,” The IMF’s Finance & Development 48, no. 3
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China gave stronger incentives to farmers to produce more agricultural products which
decreased overall income inequality, but raised income inequality among farmers causing
resistance efforts by the very farmers the policy was aimed at.41 The IMF argues
sustainable growth is only sustainable when it is shared, and efforts to combat income
inequality must be efficient and appropriate.42
When analyzing the effect on income inequality and GDP growth it is hard to
generalize for all countries, as one can see from the discussion provided above. The
relationship largely depends on the economic development of a country, political
institutions, and other (usually omitted) variables. Also, data collected for these studies
have sometimes been unreliable and inconsistent, or compiled from different various
sources.43 Focusing on a certain country alleviates this problem in that it is country
specific and, additionally, something such as policy recommendations can be tailored to
the given country. This paper discusses the effect of income inequality and GDP growth
in the United States.
The United States has experienced an increase in income inequality since the
1980s.44 Dadkhan uses time-series data from 1947 to 2001 to find a negative relationship
between income inequality and growth in the United States. He argued there was a
virtuous cycle of the United States promoting economic equality which encourages

41

Ibid.
Ibid.
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growth. Cutting taxes to the low and medium income earners would encourage this
cycle.45
Frank collected a sample of the 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1945
to 2004 measuring the Gini Index, Top 10% share of income, and Top 1% share of
income compiled using data from the IRS. He notes his statistics were consistent with
trends in U.S. income inequality in the United States from Piketty and Saez.46 Because
the states are more structurally similar to each other than most countries are to one
another, the analysis suffers from less omitted variable bias and less explanatory
variables are needed. However, similar to other panel data analysis, other regressions
were employed such as the fixed effects estimator, the mean group estimator, and pooled
mean group estimator.47 He found the relationship between income inequality and GDP
per capita growth in the United States to also be negative. His results also showed the
relationship was driven by the upper end of the income distribution (or top income
earners).48 His study lacks in the “impact of structural breaks in state-level time series,”
and the relationship potentially being nonlinear.49 Frank’s dataset is used in this paper,
and will be discussed next in the methodology and data section.

45

Dadkhah, “Income Distribution and Economic Growth in the United States: 1947 – 2001.”
Mark Frank, “Inequality and Growth in the United States: Evidence from a New State-Level Panel of
Income Inequality Measures,” Economic Inquiry 47, no. 1 (2008): 58.
47
Ibid., 65.
48
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Estimating the Gini Index
Income inequality will be measured by the Gini Coefficient. The Gini coefficient is
calculated as “twice the area between the 45° line and the Lorenz curve or as 2 cov
(Y,F(Y))/µ where Y is the income, F(Y) the cumulative distribution and µ the expected
income.”50 The Lorenz curve “plots the percentage of total income earned by various
portions of the population when the population is ordered by size of their incomes.”51
The 45° line is the line of equality where everyone ordered by size of their incomes
would have equal income. Simply put, the Gini Index of Concentration is the difference
between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve which can be expressed as:
(1)

 




Where G is the Gini Index, A is the area between the curve and diagonal 45° line, and B
is the area under the diagonal (see Figure 1).52 Because one is dealing with areas, it
easily computed with integrals. A more technical definition using integrals can be found
in Gastwirth’s “A General Definition of the Lorenz.”53
The Gini does not perfectly reflect changes in the index and underlying income
distribution. For example, the same change in the Gini could be caused by a higher
percentage of income made from top earners and less from middle earners, or a higher
percentage of income made from low earners and less from top earners. This implies

50

Joseph Silver, ed., Income Inequality Handbook (Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 225.
Joseph Gastwirth, “A General Discussion of the Lorenz Curve,” Econometrica 39, no. 6 (1971): 1037.
52
Mary Henson, “Trends in the Income of Families and Persons in the United States, 1947 – 1964,” U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, (1967): 34.
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Gastwirth “A General Discussion of the Lorenzs Curve,” 1037.
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countries can have the same Gini, but different income distributions.54 Some scholars use
quintile percentages, or what percentage of income is earned by the top 10% of income
earners, the next 10% of income earners, etc.55 The aforementioned issue aside, “[i]t has
been generally agreed, after much discussion, that the best single measure of inequality
is… the Gini Index.”56 57
Data for this paper is gathered from Frank’s working paper on inequality
measures in the United States.58 Frank collected data from the IRS and constructed Gini
Indexes for the 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1916 to 2005. However, he
did not include Alaska from 1916 to 1958 as Alaska did not gain statehood until 1959.
Yet, for some reason, Hawaii’s Gini Coefficients were included even though Hawaii did
not gain statehood until 1959. The use of data from Hawaii, Alaska, and the District of
Columbia will be excluded because either they are not included in the continental U.S., or
for lack of complete data in the time period from 1963 to 2009. Because the IRS
releases its data using income brackets (i.e. number of returns, and average income
earned by those earnings $5,000-$10,000), constructing a Gini Index had to be estimated
using Cowell’s method. The Gini Coefficient was constructed using:


(2)   ∑ ∑

54
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Waterloo Parks, (2009) 7.
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Where the i and j subscripts denote within-group (an income earning bracket) values, and
 denotes the average income within a group. The “n” denotes the numbers of tax
returns. This equation assumes everyone in group earns the average income.59
(3)     ∑
The



 


 

  

   

denotes the highest possible income for the ith group, while



denotes the

lowest possible income for the ith group. This equation assumes maximum inequality, or
everyone in a group receives either the highest or lowest income in a given group.60
(4)  



!

  ! 

This is the “compromise” in estimating the Gini Index given grouped data such as the
IRS data. Cowell notes this approximation, “works remarkably well for most
distributions.”61
Because Frank does not provide data after 2005, I constructed the Gini Index from
2005 to 2009 using the Cowell approximation of the Gini. Personal income bracket data
is provided by the IRS from 1996 to 2009 on their website.62 In order to construct the
Gini Indices for each state from 2005 to 2009, I assumed Cowell’s approximations (3),
(4), and (5).



was assumed to be $10 million for highest tax bracket, or those who

make more than $200 thousand. Changing the income assumption of the highest tax
bracket



from $10 million to $1 million and from $100 million to $10 million

changed the Gini indices of the 48 states an average of 0.0004 with the maximum change
being 0.0046. It would be safe to assume
59

 to

be $10 million because of this minimal

Frank Cowell, Measuring Inequality (Cambridge: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1977), 121.
Ibid.
61
Ibid., 129.
62
“SOI Tax Stats,” Internal Revenue Service, February 13, 2012,
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=171535,00.html (accessed: April 20, 2012).
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change to the Gini.

,

the lowest possible income for the group, was assumed to be $0 as

earning a negative personal income in a year is very infrequent. See Table 1 for
summary statistics on the Gini Coefficient, and Table 5 for Gini averages for the
individual 48 states being analyzed.
It should also be noted this study relies on income inequality data constructed
from the IRS which might not accurately reflect income distribution within the United
States. Relying on IRS data has at least three implications. Firstly, the obvious
implication is that some U.S. citizens might not pay taxes. This might cause bias in both
directions. Secondly, the IRS’s definition of income is defined by tax code, and not by
income inequality theory. Thirdly, the implication that U.S. citizens might underestimate
their income on their tax returns exists. This would probably cause a downward bias of
the Gini, as tax payers are incentivized to pay at or under a certain tax bracket to avoid
higher tax rates. These implications aside, IRS tax data should be relatively accurate
when it comes to income inequality when compared to other sources such as surveys.
Surveys might not include capital gains and other incomes defined as personal income.

3.2 Economic Growth Measurements
Economic growth is defined by real GDP per capita growth. Real GDP statistics
and population statistics were taken from the BEA.63 The GDP deflator to calculate real
GDP is indexed to 2005 U.S. dollars. The GDP divided by the population gives the GDP
per capita in a given year and state. Annual growth was calculated using:
63

“Regional Data,” U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=1 (accessed: April 20, 2012).
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(5) "#$%&' 
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Since the dataset ranges from 1963 to 2009, there are 46 growth rate points for each of
the 48 states. Summary statistics for GDP per capita growth are provided in Table 1.
In order to measure long term growth similar to Barro’s study an average growth
rate is taken over both a 10 year period and a 5 year period. But because there are 46
growth rates for each state, there are 5, and 9 constructed points, respectively, where
1963-1969 constitute one data point for each of these long term growth measurements.
These points were included because they include all the data from 1963 to 2009. The
next point in each of these measurements of ten year average growth and five year
average growth, is 1970-1979, and 1970-1974, respectively. The ten and five year
averages of economic growth continue until the final data point ending on 2009.
Summary statistics for both the ten year and five year averages are provided in Table 1.
Additionally, economic growth averages for the individual 48 states are provided in
Table 5 from the 1963 to 2009 period.

3.3 Human capital Measurement
Human capital attainment will be another important explanatory variable for GDP
per capita growth. This is typically found in educational attainment statistics. Using the
data from Frank’s working paper, college degree indices will be controlled for in the
analysis. The college degree index is calculated as the percentage of people who have
obtained a college degree, or higher degree. This variable is defined as:
(6) 1#22343 

5
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This index is calculated as a percentage of the total number of citizens, 6, within the
state.64 The variable c is defined as the number of college degrees and postgraduate
degrees earned by the population. Summary statistics for college attainment are in Table
1.

3.4 Methodology
Because the data is both cross-sectional and time-series, the data is best analyzed
through a panel analysis framework. The fixed effects model for panel analysis will be
used in this study. The fixed effects model will use the GDP per capita growth as defined
above as the dependent variable while the Gini Coefficients will be the independent
variable and education (college degree attainment) will be controlled for. This is shown
in:
(7) 478814"#$%&  9 :6:'  9 ;#22343' 



 '

The following models will use average growth rates from either five or ten years as the
dependent variable. The Gini Coefficient’s initial value at %  1 will be regressed on five
year averages or ten year averages depending on the model. Equation (7) will reflect
model (4) in Table 2. Model (3) is the same, but without the college independent
variable.
(8) =3" 434"#$%&  9 :6:'  9 ;#22343' 



 '

The fixed effects models (7), (8) on Table 3, and models (11), (12) on Table 4, will use
equation (8) as the model (with models (7) and (8) excluding the college variable).
64
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The pooled OLS does not take control for fixed effect,

.

The pooled regressions will

follow:
(9) 478814"#$%&  9 :6:'  9 ;#22343'  '
(10)

=3" 434"#$%&  9 :6:'  9 ;#22343'  '

Again, for equation (10), average growth rate in a period of five or ten years will also be
used reflected in model (5), (6), (9), and (10). Equation (9) reflects the models used in
Table 2, model (1) and (2).
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4. Results
All models show that as the Gini Coefficient increases, GDP per capita growth
will fall. When the GDP per capita growth is regressed on the Gini Coefficient (see
model 3 in Table 2) in the same period in time using the fixed effects methods, a negative
correlation exists. Additionally, when controlling for education the negative correlation
(see model 4 in Table 2) still exists and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Human
capital attainment, or education, represented by the number of college degrees attained
over the population is positively correlated with GDP per capita growth. The “within >
values” are displayed on Table 7 for the (3) and (4) models. 12.3 percent and 14.4
percent of the variation in the GDP per capita growth are explained by the Gini
Coefficient, and the Gini Coefficient and college degree attainment, respectively. This
shows relatively small, but significant power in explanation of variation. The rho value
was 0.032 and 0.057 for models (3) and (4), respectively. This means 3.2% and 5.7% of
the variation is due to the differences across panels.
The models using the pooled OLS with GDP per capita growth each year as the
dependent variable show the Gini Coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level,
model (1), and, also, statistically significant at the 1% level when controlled for
education, model (2). Both models showed a negative correlation in respect to the Gini
Coefficient and economic growth. Education was positively correlated with economic
growth, but was statistically insignificant. The > values were 10.4% and11.6% for the
models (1), and (2), respectively.
Models (7) and (8) on Table 3, show there is a negative relationship between
initial levels of the Gini Coefficient and five year average GDP per capita growth rate
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which is statistically significant at the 1% level. These models measure whether the
initial income inequality will affect economic growth over a five year period. When
education was controlled for, the Gini Coefficient remained statistically significant and
further negatively affected average GDP growth over a five year period. 39.9% and
40.0% the variation in the average 5 year GDP per capita growth was explained by the
Gini Coefficient, and the Gini Coefficient and educational attainment, respectively.
13.2% and 15.8%, the rho values for (7) and (8), respectively, of the variance in the
models is explained by the difference in the cross-sections, or states.
The pooled OLS model using five year average growth rates and initial Gini
Coefficients had a negative correlation at the 1% level. Education was not controlled for
in model (5), but was controlled for in model (6). This control variable was statistically
insignificant and positively correlated with the dependent variable. 32.4% and 33.0% of
the variation in five year average growth was explained by the models (5), and (6),
respectively.
Changing the dependent variable to a ten year average of GDP per capita growth
in models (11) and (12), still showed a statistically significant Gini Coefficient at the 1%
level. Like the 5 year average growth rate, the ten year average was regressed on initial
Gini Coefficient. This gives an indication of whether income inequality has an effect on
long-run growth. 5.3% and 11.1% of the variation in the (11) and (12) models were
explained by the differences in the states. 14.8% and 17.3% of the variation in 10 year
GDP per capita growth was explained by the variation in Gini Coefficients for the models
(11) and (12), respectively. Also, the human capital control was statistically significant
and positively correlated for the (12) model at the 1% level.
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The change in 10 year average growth rates for the pooled OLS regressions
resulted in statistically significant, negatively correlated, Gini Coefficients at the 1%
level in models (9) and (10). Education was also statistically significant at the 5% level
in model (10) and was positively correlated with economic growth. The > values were
12.1% and 12.0% for models (9) and (10), respectively.
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5. Discussion
In all of the models the Gini Index for each state is statistically significant at the
1% level. This suggests there is a correlation between economic growth and income
inequality that is non-zero, and, in fact, negative. The models in Tables 2,3, & 4 show
this relationship. While the pooled OLS models might seem unreasonable to use, they
are included to show that even without controlling for fixed effects, income inequality is
statistically significant in relationship to growth. This paper confirms Frank’s results in
his working paper using additional data constructed from 2005 to 2009 that income
inequality is negatively correlated in respect to GDP per capita growth. In addition to
determining the relationship between the Gini Coefficient and its effect on economic
growth in that period in time, an average was taken over a five or ten year period in each
state to determine the effect of initial income inequality on economic growth. These
models also showed statistically significant negative correlations at the 1% level. It is
remarkable that even the pooled OLS regressions (which do not take into account time
and cross-section effects) managed to confirm the Gini Coefficient was negatively
correlated with economic growth.
Most theoretical research of income inequality and economic growth points to a
negative correlation as seen in this empirical study. These studies attempt to justify why
there might be a casual relationship. The most reasonable in this case might be the
human capital investment theory, which states higher income inequality will mean the
lower classes cannot afford human capital investments. Poorer classes foregoing high-
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return human capital investments will negatively affect GDP per capita growth.65
Additionally, the theory that sociopolitical unrest, especially in at the present time, is
caused by income inequality which negatively affects economic growth, could be
employed.
However, other studies have argued that income inequality might simply be a
symptom of economic growth, or that a spurious relationship exists. Theoretical
arguments, such as those argued in the literature review section, suggest otherwise.
However, it is still within the realm of possibility that a spurious relationship exists. It
might be that Gini Coefficients are highly correlated with another explanatory variable
that causes GDP per capita growth to retard.
The cross-sections, or states, had a maximum rho of 15.7%, meaning variance due
to the cross-sections was relatively low. These relatively smaller rho values are
theoretically sensible seeing as states within the United States have similar economies.
Human capital attainment, the control variable in half the models, is positively
correlated to GDP per capita growth in models (2), (4), (8), (10), and (12). However, it is
negatively correlated in the (6) model which is not reasonable. Historically and
empirically speaking, education tends to cause positive economic growth.66 Model (6) is
a pooled regression and the negative correlation with human capital attainment is
statistically insignificant. Therefore model (6) is probably not reliable. Again, however,
the pooled regressions are less meaningful as these models do not taken into account
cross-sections and time effects. Model (10) which averages 10 year growth periods, has a
positive, statistically significant at the 1% level, college attainment control variable. This
65
66
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positive correlation between education and long term growth is quite reasonable. It also
makes the Gini Coefficient more negatively correlated with long-term average growth.
It is interesting to note, however, when changing the dependent variable from a
five year average growth rate to a ten year average growth rate variability in long term
average growth is explained less by income inequality and educational attainment as
reflected in the smaller > values – Models (7) and (8) using five year average growth
with 39.9% and 40.4%, to 14.8% and 17.3% in the models (11) and (12) using ten year
average growth rates. Additionally, the pooled OLS reflect the same trend – smaller >
values when the dependent variable changes from a five year average growth rate to a ten
year average growth rate. If one were to assume the primary relationship attempting to
be explained in this paper is correct, one would expect a higher > value for the 10 year
average economic growth rate – that is, more of the variation in the 10 year average is
explained by the model than a five year average.
As discussed above, it is difficult to interpret the income inequality measurement,
the Gini Coefficient, because a change in the Gini might represent either an up-down, or
down-up transfer of income. In other words, a change in the Gini might be represented
by less income gained by the top income-earners and more by the middle income-earners,
or less income gained by the middle income-earners and more by the top earners – both,
if the change were the same, would reflect the same change in Gini. Thankfully,
measurements of income inequality come in other forms such as what the top 0.1%, 1%,
5%, etc. earn as a percentage of total income. Using Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and
Saez’s database available online, one can see the trend of top income earners from 1963-
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2009 – this paper’s period of focus.67 The percentage of total income earned by the top
1%, 5%, and 10% from 1963 to 2009 are shown in Figure 2. From 1984 (with some
exceptions) the top 1%, 5%, and 10% of top income earners have steadily increased their
share of total income. This indicates, for the period of 1984 to 2009, the Gini
Coefficient’s increase has been at least, in part, due to the top income-earners increase in
share of total income. However, this does not account for the period of 1963 to 1983.
Nonetheless, whether or not the Gini changed due to down-up, or up-down effects,
income inequality is shown to have a negative effect on economic growth.

67
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6. Conclusion
This paper concludes that a statistically significant negative correlation between
income inequality and economic growth exists in the United States when using panel data
from 1963 to 2009. Constructing new data, Gini Coefficients from 2005 to 2009 in 48
states, does not change the negative relationship found by Frank (2008). However, unlike
Frank’s working paper, the educational attainment variable was not always positive in
regard to economic growth.68 Also, this paper found that in all models, income inequality
was unequivocally negatively related to economic growth. While this paper points to a
rather robust negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth,
there are a few other things to consider. As the Kuznet’s Curve suggests, there might be
a non-linear relationship between income inequality and economic growth – income
inequality will rise as economic growth rises until a point where economic growth
continues to rise, but income inequality falls.69 This might be caused by a transition from
a basic economy (pre-industrial) to an advanced economy (either industrial or
postindustrial).70 However, since this paper only looked into this relationship in the
United States, it would be expected that there would be strictly either a positive or
negative relationship. Seeing how the United States is a fairly developed country (within
an economic framework), a negative relationship would be expected.
Again, as mentioned in the discussion section, a spurious relationship might exist.
This would mean research on economic growth and income inequality is futile. Yet
because of the theoretical backing as seen in the Kuznet’s Curve, income inequality’s
68
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relationship to investment and human capital investment, and other theoretical research
on the subject, a causal relationship is more likely. If there were a way to test for a
spurious relationship there would be a number of U.S. policy implications. Further
research into such an argument would be important.
Data for this paper was collected using IRS data. It might be interesting to
compare the constructed Gini Coefficients from the IRS data and other survey data. Gini
Coefficients are difficult to measure accurately without raw data that can provide both
cumulative population and the reflected cumulative income statistics for an entire
population. Because survey data might be less reliable, it might be in the IRS’s best
interest to use their data to construct their own Gini Coefficients.
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7. Appendix
Figure 1: The Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient

Figure 2: Top Income Earners Share of Total Income from 1963 to 2009
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable
growth
gini
college
tengrow
fifthgrow

Obs.
2208
2256
2016
240
432

Mean Stan. Dev.
0.0298
0.0357
0.5244
0.0556
0.1050
0.0470
0.0289
0.0198
0.0306
0.0234

Min
(0.1599)
0.4097
0.0235
(0.0096)
(0.0259)

State (Year)
Wyoming (1986)
West Virginia (1971)
North Dakota (1966)
Utah (1965-1969)
Wyoming (1984-1989)

Max
0.3493
0.6951
0.2548
0.0911
0.1259

State (Year)
North Dakota (1973)
New York (2007)
Massachusetts (2004)
Wyoming (1980-1989)
North Dakota (1974-1979)

Table 2: Models with Growth as the Dependent Variable
Explanatory Variable
Gini

1
Pooled OLS

2
Pooled OLS

3
FE

4
FE

-0.2090***
[0.0130]

-0.2594***
[0.0231]

-0.2379***
[0.0128]

-0.3977***
[0.0330]

College

Observations

0.0259
[0.0257]
2208

1968

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.16034***
[0.0382]
2208

1968
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Table 3: Models with 5 Year Average Growth as Dependent Variable

Gini

5
Pooled OLS

6
Pooled OLS

7
FE

8
FE

-0.2594***
[0.0189]

-0.2499***
[0.0267]

-0.3040***
[0.0132]

-0.3712***
[0.0275]

College

Observations

-0.0206
[0.0284]
432

384

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.0905**
[0.0341]
432

384

36

Table 4: Models with 10 Year Average Growth as Dependent Variable

Gini

9

10

11

12

Pooled OLS

Pooled OLS

FE

FE

-0.1333***

-0.1928***

-0.1530***

-0.3134***

[0.0222]

[0.0341]

[0.0266]

[0.03320]

College

Observations

240

0.1124**

0.2599***

[0.0455]

[0.0502]

192

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

240

192
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Table 5: Averages in Gini Coefficients, Average Growth in Gini, and Average Economic Growth for Individual States

Average
State
Gini
Alabama
0.5183
Arizona
0.5269
Arkansas
0.5294
California
0.5469
Colorado
0.5319
Connecticut
0.5454
Delaware
0.5178
Florida
0.5590
Georgia
0.5293
Idaho
0.5331
Illinois
0.5258
Indiana
0.5002
Iowa
0.5111
Kansas
0.5231
Kentucky
0.5165
Louisiana
0.5388
Maine
0.5006
Maryland
0.5100
Massachusetts
0.5258
Michigan
0.5060
Minnesota
0.5178
Mississippi
0.5336
Missouri
0.5202
Montana
0.5494

Average
Growth in
Gini
0.00502
0.00428
0.00437
0.00651
0.00476
0.00876
0.00139
0.00556
0.00578
0.00388
0.00616
0.00546
0.00358
0.00522
0.00334
0.00509
0.00466
0.00506
0.00685
0.00600
0.00402
0.00469
0.00464
0.00597

Average
Economic
Growth
0.03123
0.02722
0.03236
0.02659
0.03198
0.03347
0.03322
0.02980
0.03189
0.02652
0.02637
0.02527
0.03075
0.03076
0.02715
0.03264
0.03035
0.03168
0.03250
0.02058
0.03123
0.03154
0.02623
0.02636

State
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Average
Gini
0.5354
0.5435
0.5058
0.5252
0.5411
0.5509
0.5112
0.5326
0.4926
0.5380
0.5155
0.5086
0.5083
0.5092
0.5592
0.5256
0.5591
0.5157
0.5112
0.5114
0.5096
0.4919
0.5025
0.5493

Average
Growth
in Gini
0.00355
0.00557
0.00620
0.00732
0.00460
0.00733
0.00455
0.00406
0.00563
0.00394
0.00552
0.00660
0.00626
0.00541
0.00427
0.00418
0.00469
0.00542
0.00531
0.00438
0.00634
0.00512
0.00513
0.00503

Average
Economic
Growth
0.03208
0.02125
0.03346
0.02979
0.02617
0.02817
0.03130
0.03735
0.02464
0.03092
0.02864
0.02844
0.02922
0.03224
0.03767
0.03093
0.03188
0.02714
0.03092
0.03485
0.02690
0.02652
0.02750
0.03397
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Table 6: Fixed Effects Models with Rho and Within R-Squared Values
3
FE

4
FE

7
FE

8
FE

11
FE

12
FE

Rho Values

0.032

0.057

0.132

0.158

0.053

0.111

Within R-Sq

0.123

0.144

0.399

0.404

0.148

0.173

Observations

2208

1968

432

384

240

192

Table 7: Pooled OLS Models with R-Squared Values
1
Pooled
OLS

2
Pooled
OLS

5
Pooled
OLS

6
Pooled
OLS

9
Pooled
OLS

10
Pooled
OLS

R Squared

0.104

0.116

0.324

0.330

0.121

0.120

Observations

2208

1968

432

384

240

192
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